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1 Introduction
In Pelger (2011) we have found that female-owned firms invest less than male-owned firms.
This holds for the probability of investing, the extensive margin of investment, as well as
for the investment rate, the intensive margin. Furthermore, women’s investments seem to
react less to a marginal increase in cash flow, which can be interpreted as women being
effected less by financial constraints. An analysis of stated investment goals reveals that
women less often indicate growth oriented goals for their investment. Hence, women’s
lower propensity to invest is rather driven by preferences than by financial constraints.
Certainly, proxying financial constraints by cash flow has its limits in providing insights on
a firm’s financial possibilities. Restricted access to financial resources is one of the main
obstacles for investing, therefore it is highly relevant to gain direct evidence on firms’
financing behavior. In this paper we revisit the issue of financial constraints and take a
closer look at gender differences in investment financing, credit application and denial.
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to empirically analyze gender differ-
ences in the composition of firm investment financing, the credit application behavior
and application outcome of German firm owners. As in Pelger (2011), we use the KfW
Mittelstandspanel, a data set on German SMEs for the years 2003-2009.1 We analyze
both the supply side and demand side of access to bank loans and we are able to control
for various firm and owner characteristics.
Most of the few previous studies have not found that female firm owners are affected
more by financial constraints than male owners (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al. 2002). However,
women seem to have different financing patterns. Already at start-up stage female-owned
firms use less external debt and rely more on personal sources (Carter et al. 2007). Also
women are less likely to seek external finance for follow-up investments (Coleman and
Robb 2009, Sena et al. 2010). Muravyev et al. (2009) find that on average female
firm owners have a higher proportion of retained earnings and a smaller share of bank
financing. Robb and Robinson (2010) reveal that the average female-owned firm holds
about 5% less debt than a comparable male-owned business.
Our analysis on gender differences in financing structure confirms previous evidence on
financing patterns. We examine the respective shares of equity capital, external capital,
business development capital and other funds in investment financing. We find that in
financing their investments female firm owners rely more on internal capital and less on
external funds than male firm owners, irrespective of the relative size of the investment.
This difference in firm financing could be either a result of individual preferences on
getting into debt or of gender discrimination on the capital market. In our empirical
1See Pelger (2011) for a detailed description of the data set.
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analysis we address both approaches. We analyze the demand side and the supply side
on the credit market. More precisely, we examine the impact of the firm owner’s gender
on the probability of applying for credit and the probability of a non-successful outcome.
We consider only investing firms. Our analysis of credit application behavior reveals that
female firm owners who invest are significantly less likely to apply for credit than investing
male firm owners. After splitting the sample according to positive and non-positive sales
expectations we find that the gender difference in the probability of applying for credit is
only evident among firm owners that have non-positive sales expectations. Female-owned
firms with neutral or negative sales expectations are less likely to apply for credit when
they invest compared to their male counterparts. For firms with positive expectations the
probability of applying does not significantly differ between men and women.
An analysis of application denial rates shows that female-owned firms are not more
likely to be denied credit. This result however suffers from sample selection bias, as it is
likely that the female-owned firms that apply for credit represent a positive subsample
of all applying firms. Potentially successful female applicants may be more reluctant to
apply for credit because they fear and misconceive a rejection (Sena et al. 2010).
Our results suggest that differences in investment financing are not attributable to
discrimination against women on the credit market. Despite this finding, women might
still be more credit constrained because they are more likely to be discouraged from
applying and therefore self-constrain themselves. This result is probably attributable to
certain personal traits that are associated typically with being female. Previous studies
have found that women are more risk-averse, less self-confident and report more intense
nervousness and fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes (Croson and Gneezy
2009). In anticipation of non-positive sales development, these traits may prevent women
more from securing external funds or even from applying for credit. Several robustness
checks underpin our results.
2 Investment financing
2.1 Theoretical and empirical background
Several theories have tried to explain the complex issue of firm financing and capital
structure. The starting point was the model of Modigliani and Miller (1958) who state
that under the assumption of perfect and frictionless capital markets a firm’s financial
decisions do not affect the firm’s market value and the cost of capital. In contrast, later
theories on capital structure account for the fact that in an imperfect world financial
decisions may be influenced by taxes, information asymmetries and agency costs.
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The most prominent two competing theories are the pecking order theory and the
trade-off theory. The pecking order theory focuses on information asymmetries between
managers and external investors. Managers and firm owners have better information
about their firms and prefer to keep control over the firm. This leads to a hierarchical
order of financial resources in a firm’s policy according to the involved level of information
costs and risk. The preferred source of financing are internal funds as they involve no
information costs, low risk and highest control. The second most preferred source is
debt, and the last alternative is new equity capital, which is associated with the highest
information costs and risks (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984).
The trade-off theory in contrast refers to an optimal capital structure resulting from
a profit-maximizing balance of tax advantages and bankruptcy costs of debt. The impli-
cations of this theory are, particularly for Germany, not that straightforward as govern-
mental subsidies for firm investment are very complex and generate different firm-specific
financing incentives. Yet, there is empirical work supporting both theories (Shyam-Sunder
and Myers 1999, Cole 2011).
Traditional capital theories as well as most empirical studies focus on large, publicly
traded firms and do not consider the influence of owner-characteristics on firm financing.
However, there is evidence that both firm size and owner characteristics can have an
influence on financing behavior.
López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) show how small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs) differ from large firms in regards to financing. SMEs are affected more by informa-
tion asymmetries and are usually not listed on the stock market. Therefore SMEs depend
more on internal funds and their financing structure is less diversified. Female-owned
firms are on average smaller than male-owned firms, therefore gender differences in cap-
ital structure could possibly also be attributed to size. Regarding owner-characteristics,
Ang et al. (2010) demonstrate that individual socioeconomic and demographic factors of
the firm owner (e.g. age, gender, education, wealth, experience etc.) can add to a better
understanding of capital structure decisions. Individual preferences and risk tolerance
of the owner have an important impact on the firm’s capital structure if the personal
financial situation is directly affected by the firm’s outcome. Owners of small firms that
are individually liable may opt for different financial decisions than owners of larger firms
with limited liability. Typically, the smaller the firm the more financing decisions depend
on the firm owner and his or her personal features.
Myers (2001, p. 99) points out that ‘the theories (on capital structure) are not de-
signed to be general’ and that the understanding of firms’ financing structures is still
limited. There exists no universal theory as the topic of firm financing is too complex and
diverse. Every firm has individual objectives and needs. Accordingly, we do not perform
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a hypothesis test of a particular capital structure theory in our empirical analysis, as we
do not expect any of the traditional theories to provide useful predictions. Instead, we opt
for an explorative approach where we try to reveal the determinants of the composition
of investment financing and particularly the correlation with gender. A firm’s financing
strategy is not self-determined but subject to external and internal constraints. In light of
the findings discussed above we expect investment in female-owned firms to be financed
by a higher share of internal funds than in male-owned firms.
2.2 Gender differences in financing patterns
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the composition of investment financing averaged
over the years 2004-2009 for female and male-owned firms.2 Investment financing consists
of the sum of internal capital, external capital, business development capital and other
funds that are used to finance the investment. All together the shares of these financing
resources sum up to 100 percent. The category external capital contains all types of capital
that are raised outside the firm, namely venture capital, mezzanine capital, bank loans
and capital from external shareholders. Business development capital refers to subsidy
loans provided by promotional institutions like e.g. the KfW Bankengruppe.
Table 1: Summary statistics investment financing
t-test 
Percentage of Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. p-value
~ internal capital 54.7 41.1 58.5 42.3 0.000***
~ external capital 30.2 37.3 26.8 37.1 0.000***
~ business development capital 8.0 20.3 7.6 21.1 0.348
~ other funds 7.1 21.3 7.1 21.7 0.963
total 100 100
Male owner Female owner
Notes: N=24,302. The category external capital consists of venture capital, mezzanine capital, 
bank loans and external shareholder capital. Business development capital refers to subsidy 
loans provided by promotional institutions. Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of 
equality of means under the assumption of equal variances. *** indicates significance at the 
10% levels.
A two-sample t-test of equality of means reveals significant differences in the shares of
external and internal capital used for investment financing. The share of internal capital is
by 58.5% to 54.7% significantly higher for female-owned firms, while the share of external
capital is lower (26.8% vs. 30.2%). For the share of business development capital and
2Table 4 in the Appendix contains descriptive statistics of all variables included in the regression on
investment financing.
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other funds there are no significant differences. However, this difference in the shares of
internal vs. external capital is not necessarily a gender effect, it may be attributable to
differences in firm characteristics such as size, industry etc.
In order to separate the impact of gender from other owner- and firm-specific charac-
teristics we estimate a random effects panel tobit model for the share of each financing
resource separately. The model has the following specification:
y∗it = αi + γfi + βx
′
it + vi + uit (1)
yit =

0 if y∗it ≤ 0
yit if 0 < y∗it < 100
100 if y∗it ≥ 100
(2)
with yit denoting the share of internal, external, business development or other capital
with left-censoring at the lower bound of 0 percent and right-censoring at the upper bound
of 100 percent. fi is a dummy variable for female ownership, vi stands for time-invariant
individual effects, and uit is the remaining disturbance. xit is a vector including firm- and
owner-specific variables, i.e. firm size, firm age, age of the firm owner, graduation status
of the owner, size of the management team, sales growth as a performance indicator, and
cash flow as indicator for financial constraints. As a further control variable we add the
investment rate to depict the relative size of the investment.
The regression results in Table 2 confirm the descriptive pattern. The share of inter-
nal capital in investment financing is higher in female-owned firms than in male-owned
firms while the share of external capital is lower. For business development capital and
other funds we observe no significant difference. These gender differences in the use of
external vs. internal capital in investment financing could be either a result of gender dif-
ferences in firm owner’s willingness to get into debt or of differences in credit availability.
In the following section we will address both approaches, differences in preferences and
discrimination.
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Table 2: Random effects panel tobit model of investment financing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
investment financing, share of ~
internal 
capital
external
capital
business
development
capital
other 
funds
Female owner (d) 5.030** -5.842** -4.298 1.582
(2.458) (2.557) (2.864) (4.167)
Lagged FTE (log) -9.546*** 7.701*** 3.697*** 13.94***
(1.143) (1.195) (1.357) (2.035)
Lagged sales (log) 0.713 2.423** 0.140 -6.169***
(1.030) (1.079) (1.227) (1.815)
Investment rate (inv./sales) -10.74*** 6.680*** 9.766*** 4.775***
(0.794) (0.802) (0.751) (1.154)
Cash flow 1.06e-05*** -9.72e-06*** 1.92e-06* -9.61e-06***
(1.03e-06) (1.09e-06) (1.13e-06) (1.90e-06)
Sales growth 0.380 -2.549 8.705*** 7.163*
(1.972) (2.110) (2.534) (3.773)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -1.631 6.916*** -8.274*** -3.413
(2.224) (2.369) (2.749) (4.111)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -4.323** 9.834*** -4.906* -6.781*
(2.173) (2.290) (2.576) (3.849)
Firm age >20 years (d) -4.938** 10.88*** -7.531*** -9.248**
(2.218) (2.325) (2.609) (3.884)
2 managers/owners (d) -2.406 1.318 2.054 4.495*
(1.523) (1.597) (1.830) (2.698)
3 or more managers/owners (d) -0.102 -1.974 1.669 4.862
(2.187) (2.295) (2.609) (3.840)
Graduate (d) 12.69*** -13.93*** -2.033 0.263
(1.524) (1.577) (1.756) (2.579)
Age firm owner 0.186** -0.255*** -0.162* -0.173
(0.076) (0.079) (0.088) (0.129)
Constant 84.59*** -51.03*** -66.15*** -78.41***
(12.21) (12.81) (14.51) (21.45)
Observations 24,302 24,302 24,302 24,302
Female observations 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
left-censored 4,294 12,632 19,869 20,928
uncensored 10,578 9,165 4,197 2,894
right-censored 9,430 2,505 236 480
Number of firms 13,057 13,057 13,057 13,057
Avg. Obs. per firm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression of investment financing for the years 
2004-2009.  Each regression includes industry, legal form and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The 
reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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3 Credit application and application outcome
Credit constraints can be driven by demand-side or supply-side factors (Coleman and
Robb 2009, Bellucci et al. 2010, Verheul and Thurik 2001). On the demand-side, different
preferences, higher risk and debt aversion as well as lower financial literacy may, ceteris
paribus, prevent women more from applying for credit. On the supply-side, discrimination
on the financial market may result in lower credit approval rates or worse credit conditions
for women. In this paper we examine both sides of the credit application process of
investing firms.
3.1 Previous evidence
Previous empirical studies have focused mainly on the US economy and have not found
strong evidence that female-owned firms have greater difficulties in funding their invest-
ments. Most authors use the same data base for their analysis, namely the Federal Re-
serve’s Surveys of Small Business Financing (SSBFs). Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) find that
denial rates of female owners increase to some extent with lender concentration but they
find no evidence for discrimination in terms of interest rates. Blanchflower et al. (2003)
and Blanchard et al. (2008) confirm that gender differences in denial rates are negligible.
For Italy in contrast, Bellucci et al. (2010) reveal that female owned firms do not pay
higher interest rates but are disadvantaged in terms of collateral requirements and credit
availability. Muravyev et al. (2009) analyze gender differences in credit constraints with
the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
which contains data for 34 countries. They find that female entrepreneurs are more likely
to be denied credit and pay higher interest rates, but that these differences vanish with
increasing level of a financial development. Yet, their cross-country analysis does not
allow to draw country-specific conclusions.
On the demand side, none of the authors cited above find clear evidence that women
have lower application rates. Cole and Mehran (2009) find only very weak evidence of
higher application discouragement for women. Regarding gender specific perceptions,
Roper and Scott (2009) find that women in the UK at start-up stage - independent from
their real financial situation - are more likely to perceive that they have problems in
accessing external funds.
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3.2 The credit application process
Figure 1 describes the credit application process in three conditional stages. According to
Cole (2010), firms can be classified into four categories of ‘borrower types’: non-borrower,
discouraged borrower, denied borrower and approved borrower. Unfortunately, we cannot
observe the first stage of the application process in our data, we do not know whether
firms need or do not need credit. We cannot differentiate between non-borrowers and
discouraged borrowers, in our data they form one group, the non-applicants. We are
constrained to analyzing the application process without its first stage and dealing with
the problem of selection bias. Discouraged borrowers may decide not to apply because
they anticipate or fear a loan denial. Their firm specific characteristics could be similar to
applying firms that were not credit approved. We know from the literature that women
are less over-confident, more risk-averse and also have a greater fear of negative outcomes
when the get involved in a risky decision (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Consequently, women
may be more reluctant and discouraged to apply than men are. As a result, female-owned
firms which do apply could be a positively selected subgroup with better performance
and creditworthiness than the average male-owned firm that applies for credit. As a
consequence, our results suffer from sample selection bias, therefore discrimination in the
form of credit denial could be underestimated.
Figure 1: Credit application process
Source: Borrowed and customized from Cole (2010)
(1)
Need 
Credit?
(2)
Apply
for
Credit? (3)
Get
Credit?
Approved
Borrower
No
Non-
Borrower
Denied
Borrower
Discouraged
Borrower
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Non-Applicants
The issue of sample selection is a well known problem in econometric modeling of dis-
crimination as well as the omitted variable bias. The problem can be tackled to some
extent if the necessary information on all application stages is available. Cavalluzzo et al.
(2002) regard discouraged borrowers as potential applicants and model this self-selection
into applying by estimating the two models jointly with a selection model. Then, the
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main equation models the application outcome while the selection equation models the
decision whether to apply or not. Alternatively, successful credit applicants can be com-
pared to all firms with unmet credit needs, the rejected and discouraged. Blanchflower
et al. (2003), Blanchard et al. (2008), Cole (2010) and Cole and Mehran (2009) employ
similar approaches to deal with sample selection. Muravyev et al. (2009) point to the fact
that - in contrast to not considering the discouraged applicants - this approach overesti-
mates discrimination. The results are however often similar to the single equation model
employed by us.
3.3 Empirical analysis
We estimate the following two equations separately, each with a linear probability random
effects panel GLS model.
Prob(Applied = 1) = α + β1fi + γ1Xit + δ1Dit + uit (3)
Prob(Denied = 1) = α + β2fi + γ2Xit + δ2Dit + eit if Applied = 1 (4)
With the first equation we estimate the demand-side of the application process, the prob-
ability of applying for credit, and with the second equation we estimate the supply-side,
the application outcome. The dependent variable is binary in both equations. In the
application decision it takes the value 1 if a firm has applied for credit and 0 if the firm
did not apply. For the application outcome it takes the value 1 if a firm’s application
was denied and 0 if the firm’s application was approved. f denotes a dummy variable
for female ownership, X is a vector of firm-specific characteristics (size in terms of sales
and employees, cash flow, firm age, team size, sales expectations, innovation activity and
sales growth) and D is a vector of further owner-specific characteristics (age of the firm
owner and graduate status). For our analysis we consider only investing firms.3 Table 3
shows the results of five regression for the application decision and one for the application
outcome.
3see Appendix Table 5 for descriptive statistics of all variables included in the regression.
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Table 3: Linear probability RE panel GLS model of credit application and outcome
Dependent 
Variable (1/0)
(1)
applied for 
credit
(2)
application 
denied
(1A)
applied for 
credit
with
expect.
(1B)
applied for 
credit
with exp.
 interact.
(1C)
applied for 
credit
 firms with 
pos. exp.
(1D)
applied for 
credit
 firms without 
pos. exp.
Female owner (d) -0.047*** 0.001 -0.047*** -0.067*** -0.010 -0.068***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020)
Positive sales expect. (d) 0.023** 0.018*
(0.009) (0.010)
Interact fem.*pos. exp. (d) 0.055*
(0.030)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.036*** 0.005 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Lagged sales (log) 0.045*** -0.018** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.054***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Planned investment rate 0.802*** 0.014 0.797*** 0.795*** 0.734*** 0.851***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.042)
Cash flow -4.99e-08*** -1.96e-08*** -4.97e-08*** -4.98e-08*** -4.39e-08*** -5.89e-08***
(7.46e-09) (4.71e-09) (7.45e-09) (7.44e-09) (1.11e-08) (9.67e-09)
Return on sales (lag) -0.011** -0.161*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.014 -0.012***
(0.005) (0.035) (0.005) (0.005) (0.050) (0.003)
Sales growth 0.038** -0.044*** 0.038** 0.037** 0.042 0.038*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.021)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.022 -0.032** 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.019
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.021)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.028* -0.019 0.031* 0.031* 0.045* 0.029
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.033** -0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.043 0.039*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.031*** -0.039*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.028 0.036**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014)
3 or more manag./own. (d) 0.032** -0.048*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.023 0.045**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.019)
Graduate (d) -0.090*** 0.005 -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.102*** -0.087***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013)
Age firm owner -0.002*** 0.0004 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation activities (d) 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.017 0.031***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
Constant -0.088 0.373*** -0.089 -0.087 0.053 -0.186*
(0.092) (0.086) (0.092) (0.092) (0.148) (0.113)
R-squared 0.210 0.048 0.211 0.211 0.187 0.225
Observations 10,796 5,599 10,796 10,796 3,824 6,972
Female observations 1,018 450 1,018 1,018 366 652
Firms 6,334 3,778 6,334 6,334 2,834 4,630
Avg. obs. per firm 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
sample split 
Notes: This table presents the results of random effects panel GLS regressions for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard 
errors. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference category are 
manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.*,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of firms in (1C) and (1D) does not add up to the number of firms in the full sample (N=10,796), 
as the firms may have differing expectations over the years and therefore may be present in both samples after the split.
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Regression (1) is the basic specification of the application decision. We find that female
owners are significantly less likely to apply for a credit. The probability that an investing
female-owned firm applies for credit is on average 4.7 percentage points lower than for a
male-owned firm with the same characteristics. Yet, the results from regression (2) show
that if women apply, there is no difference in the probability of being denied credit as
compared to male-owned firms. This result may be suggestive but for the above stated
reasons of self selection it cannot be interpreted as absence of discrimination. Given that
women apply significantly less often for credit, it is very likely that the female-owned
firms that do apply represent a positive selection.
This raises the question on the underlying reasons for women’s lower probability of
applying for credit. Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude that women’s higher risk aversion
can be traced back to different evaluations of risk, differences in the perceptibility of emo-
tions and male overconfidence. Furthermore, women report more intense nervousness and
fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes. The application for credit involves
the possibility of being rejected and borrowing money involves the risk of not to be able
to bear the costs. This suggests that women may be less likely to apply for credit because
they are more risk averse and would cope worse with a credit denial. We cannot test for
this assumption as our data do not provide a valid measure for risk aversion. Instead,
we try to better understand this fact by accounting for the sales expectations of the firm
owner. The firms were asked about their sales expectations for the next year and had to
answer in three categories, ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’ expectations. These expecta-
tions may be realistic, overoptimistic or even too pessimistic. Interesting for our analysis
are gender differences in credit application that go together with these expectations. If
women indeed have a stronger fear in anticipation of negative outcomes, they should be
more reluctant to apply for credit when they do not have positive expectations about the
future.
In regression (1A) we re-estimate regression (1) with an additional explanatory dummy
variable for positive sales expectations. We find that firms with positive expectations are
significantly more likely to apply for a credit while the quantitative impact of our dummy
variable for female ownership does not change. Next, we include an interaction term for
positive sales expectations and female ownership in regression (1B). As a further sensitiv-
ity check we split the sample into firms that have positive expectations in a given year and
firms with neutral or negative expectations (regressions (1C) and (1D)). The results show
that female-owned firms with positive expectations do not differ significantly from male
owned firms in their probability of applying for a credit. But, as expected, female-owned
firms with non-positive expectations exhibit higher reluctance of applying for credit. The
probability that a female-owned firm with non-positive expectations applies for credit is
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6.8 percentage points lower than for a male-owned firm with non-positive expectations.
We interpret this result as evidence of higher risk aversion and higher fear of failure for
female business owners that have non-positive expectations. We also observe that the
model has a higher explanatory power for firms with non-positive expectations (R2 of
0.225 vs. 0.187).
4 Robustness Checks
We run several robustness checks for each regression in order to test for reliability of our
findings. These robustness checks essentially confirm our central findings, as the signs
and the significances do not differ substantially.
1. check: other model specification, GLS instead of tobit.
The tobit approach is based on strong assumptions about the conditional data distribu-
tion and functional form. As these strong assumptions are likely to be violated, tobit is a
non-robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). We therefore re-run the regressions of
the composition of investment financing with a more robust simple random effects panel
GLS model (see Appendix Table 6) which confirms the results from the tobit regression
(Table 2).
2. check: other model specification, probit instead of GLS.
The decision to apply as well as the application outcome are both binary dependent vari-
ables. These are usually estimated with a non-linear regression model. We therefore
repeat all regressions on credit application with a random effects panel probit approach
(see Appendix Table 7).
3. check: considering only firms with one owner.
In the main regressions the dummy variable on female ownership refers to the gender
of the principal owner. To make sure that the decision maker in the firm is indeed the
principal owner, we repeat the estimations on the composition of investment financing
and on credit application and its outcome considering only firms with one owner-manager
(see Appendix Tables 8 and 9). The results do not substantially differ from our main
regressions, except for the regression on investment financing where the gender variable in
the regression for internal capital turns out to be not significant. However, the magnitude
of the coefficients is approximately the same, the insignificance is probably driven by a
higher standard error.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate how male-owned and female-owned firms differ in investment
financing, credit application behavior and application outcome. Our analysis shows that
women rely more on internal funds and finance their investment with a lower share of
external capital than male-owned firms, independently of the magnitude of the investment.
Female firm owners are significantly less likely to apply for credit but not more likely
to be credit denied. However, the last result may underestimate discrimination on the
credit market as applying female-owned firms might represent a positively selected sample.
Interestingly, gender differences in credit application behavior depend on the firm owner’s
expectation of future sales outcomes. We find that female-owned firms with non-positive
sales expectations are significantly less likely to apply for credit than male-owned firms.
For firms with positive sales expectations we find no gender difference in the probability
to apply for credit. This points to the fact that female risk aversion is only prominent in
anticipation of decreasing or constant sales volume. With positive sales prospects female
firm owners are not more hesitant than male owners to bear the risks and the costs of a
credit.
Yet, with our data we cannot judge whether women’s more retentive or men’s more
offensive behavior leads to a better outcome for the firm as we have no information on
credit repayment behavior and return on investment. On one hand side, through more
cautious investment behavior a firm could miss growth opportunities. On the other hand,
a too optimistic investment behavior could result in financial losses or even in business
failure. Whether women’s more cautious or men’s more risky investment and application
behavior generates better business outcomes remains a question to be answered by future
research. A further analysis of gender differences in firm performance after investment
with more appropriate data could shed more light on this question. Regarding the supply
side on the credit market, our results may motivate future empirical research to gain
more insights into gender differences in interest rates, credit conditions and collateral
requirements.
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Appendix
Table 4: Summary statistics regression sample investment financing
Gender variable Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Female owner (d) 0.096 0.295 0 1
t-test 
Firm characteristics Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Investment financing in %
~ internal capital 54.7 41.1 0 100 58.5 42.3 0 100 0.000***
~ external capital* 30.2 37.3 0 100 26.8 37.1 0 100 0.000***
~ development capital 8.0 20.3 0 100 7.6 21.1 0 100 0.348
~ other funds 7.1 21.3 0 100 7.1 21.7 0 100 0.963
FTE (number of employees) 42.7 64.9 0.5 1,501 29.3 44.3 0.5 462 0.000***
Sales (in million Euro) 6.808 11.700 0.010 104 4.023 8.839 0.010 102 0.000***
Investment rate (Inv./Sales) 0.125 0.713 0.1 1.497 0.120 0.191 0.1 1.125 0.243
Cashflow (in thousand Euro) 433 778 -324 8,224 273 619 -251 7,400 0.000***
Sales growth 0.089 0.284 -1.540 2.037 0.092 0.297 -1.539 1.997 0.546
Firm age 32 37 1 384 29.2 37 1 377 0.001***
Firm age <5 years (d) 0.150 0.357 0 1 0.236 0.425 0 1 0.000***
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.135 0.342 0 1 0.155 0.362 0 1 0.008***
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.302 0.459 0 1 0.242 0.428 0 1 0.000***
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.412 0.492 0 1 0.367 0.482 0 1 0.000***
1 owner-manager (d) 0.548 0.498 0 1 0.548 0.498 0 1 0.516
2 owners/managers (d) 0.303 0.459 0 1 0.317 0.466 0 1 0.146
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.117 0.321 0 1 0.103 0.304 0 1 0.040**
Owner characteristics
Graduate (d) 0.559 0.496 0 1 0.547 0.498 0 1 0.256
Age firm owner 48.6 10.1 20 80 45.1 9.3 23 78 0.000***
Female owner
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the sample used in the estimation of a random effects panel tobit model of 
investment financing in Table 4.2. N = 20,254. Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means under the 
assumption of equal variances. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Male owner
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Table 5: Summary statistics regression sample credit application and outcomeTable : Sum ary statistics regression sample credit application and ist outcome
Gender variable Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Female owner (d) 0.094 0.292 0 1
t-test 
Firm characteristics Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Applied for credit 0.527 0.499 0 1 0.442 0.497 0 1 0.000***
Credit denied (only applying firms) 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.096 0.295 0 1 0.320
Sales expectations positive (d) 0.354 0.478 0 1 0.359 0.480 0 1 0.709
FTE (number of employees) 44.2 64.3 0.5 1253 30.5 46.3 1 462 0.000***
Sales (in million Euro) 7,177 12,100 0,010 104 4,111 8,850 0,010 102 0.000***
Planned investment rate 0.104 0.167 0.1 1.497 0.120 0.191 0.1 1.455 0.003***
Cashflow (in thousand Euro) 457 794.7 -320 8,150 296 670.2 -251 6,800 0.000***
Return on sales 0.067 0.118 -3.523 1.522 0.099 0.167 -0.449 1.348 0.000***
Sales growth 0.065 0.269 -1.540 2.019 0.063 0.261 -1.522 1.923 0.881
Firm age 33.3 37.6 1 384 30.4 37 1 312 0.000***
Firm age <5 years (d) 0.129 0.335 0 1 0.207 0.406 0 1 0.000***
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.132 0.339 0 1 0.171 0.377 0 1 0.001***
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.313 0.464 0 1 0.256 0.437 0 1 0.000***
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.426 0.494 0 1 0.365 0.482 0 1 0.000***
1 owner-manager (d) 0.538 0.499 0 1 0.509 0.016 0 1 0.077*
2 owners/managers (d) 0.306 0.461 0 1 0.345 0.475 0 1 0.011**
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.128 0.334 0 1 0.111 0.314 0 1 0.122
Innovation (d) 0.505 0.500 0 1 0.399 0.490 0 1 0.000***
Owner characteristics
Graduate (d) 0.593 0.491 0 1 0.568 0.496 0 1 0.113
Age firm owner 48.8 10 20 80 45.1 9 23 78 0.000***
Male owner Female owner
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Table 6: Random effects panel GLS regressions of investment financing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
investment financing, share of ~
internal 
capital
external
capital
business
development
capital
other 
funds
Female owner (d) 2.428** -2.302** -0.291 0.225
(1.083) (0.950) (0.543) (0.544)
Lagged FTE (log) -4.051*** 2.377*** 0.349 1.362***
(0.524) (0.460) (0.272) (0.260)
Lagged sales (log) 0.005 1.050** -0.263 -0.775***
(0.566) (0.435) (0.279) (0.244)
Investment rate (inv./sales) -5.789* 2.388* 2.900* 0.417
(3.065) (1.302) (1.505) (0.307)
Cash flow 4.77e-06*** -3.58e-06*** 2.06e-07 -1.45e-06***
(4.53e-07) (3.94e-07) (2.37e-07) (2.09e-07)
Sales growth 0.763 -1.858** 0.942 0.254
(1.163) (0.862) (0.594) (0.539)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.592 2.296** -1.392*** -0.438
(0.990) (0.900) (0.520) (0.538)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -1.785* 3.407*** -0.850* -0.753
(0.966) (0.855) (0.503) (0.512)
Firm age >20 years (d) -1.481 3.676*** -1.468*** -0.736
(0.986) (0.880) (0.511) (0.509)
2 managers/owners (d) -1.213* 0.329 0.305 0.522
(0.695) (0.620) (0.343) (0.386)
3 or more managers/owners (d) -0.315 -1.060 0.486 0.844
(0.995) (0.890) (0.486) (0.568)
Graduate (d) 5.540*** -5.231*** -0.460 0.117
(0.676) (0.613) (0.328) (0.345)
Age firm owner 0.095*** -0.077** -0.023 0.003
(0.034) (0.030) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 65.05*** 9.927* 12.04*** 12.66***
(6.988) (5.203) (3.452) (2.927)
R-squared 0.047 0.057 0.025 0.072
Observations 24,302 24,302 24,302 24,302
Female observations 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
Firms 13,057 13,057 13,057 13,057
Avg. obs. per firm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects GLS regression of investment financing for the years 2004-
2009.  Each regression includes industry, legal form and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The 
reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Random effects panel probit regressions of credit application and outcome
Dependent 
Variable (1/0)
(1)
applied for 
credit
(2)
application 
denied
(1A)
applied for 
credit
with
expect.
(1B)
applied for 
credit
with exp.
 interact.
(1C)
applied for 
credit
 firms with 
pos. exp.
(1D)
applied for 
credit
 firms without 
pos. exp.
Female owner (d) -0.196*** 0.019 -0.197*** -0.290*** -0.042 -0.303***
(0.074) (0.182) (0.074) (0.089) (0.116) (0.092)
Positive sales expectat. (d) 0.068* 0.045
(0.041) (0.043)
Interact female*pos. exp. (d) 0.258*
(0.136)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.143*** 0.059 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.201*** 0.091**
(0.037) (0.087) (0.037) (0.037) (0.056) (0.046)
Lagged sales (log) 0.221*** -0.104 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.173*** 0.262***
(0.034) (0.082) (0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.043)
Planned investment rate 4.263*** 0.219 4.237*** 4.228*** 3.747*** 4.679***
(0.180) (0.247) (0.181) (0.181) (0.274) (0.256)
Cash flow -2.29e-07*** -8.71e-07*** -2.28e-07*** -2.29e-07*** -2.00e-07*** -2.67e-07***
(3.22e-08) (1.74e-07) (3.22e-08) (3.22e-08) (4.76e-08) (4.37e-08)
Return on sales (lag) -0.051 -2.042*** -0.048 -0.049 0.021 -0.348
(0.076) (0.435) (0.073) (0.074) (0.130) (0.230)
Sales growth 0.141** -0.471*** 0.140* 0.138* 0.178 0.125
(0.072) (0.176) (0.072) (0.072) (0.117) (0.094)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.103 -0.319* 0.108 0.110 0.100 0.099
(0.077) (0.183) (0.077) (0.077) (0.119) (0.099)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.129* -0.161 0.137* 0.137* 0.168 0.146
(0.071) (0.166) (0.071) (0.071) (0.112) (0.090)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.150** -0.390** 0.162** 0.161** 0.188* 0.170*
(0.071) (0.174) (0.072) (0.071) (0.112) (0.090)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.140*** -0.441*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.129* 0.161***
(0.049) (0.123) (0.049) (0.049) (0.076) (0.061)
3 or more manag./own. (d) 0.144** -0.675*** 0.144** 0.143** 0.106 0.198**
(0.067) (0.187) (0.067) (0.067) (0.103) (0.085)
Graduate (d) -0.398*** 0.0303 -0.400*** -0.400*** -0.449*** -0.396***
(0.048) (0.111) (0.048) (0.048) (0.077) (0.059)
Age firm owner -0.008*** 0.006 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Innovation activities (d) 0.135*** 0.457*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.083 0.136***
(0.041) (0.105) (0.041) (0.041) (0.070) (0.051)
Constant -3.012*** -0.551 -3.008*** -3.002*** -2.362*** -3.392***
(0.409) (0.981) (0.408) (0.408) (0.627) (0.525)
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 10,796 5,599 10,796 10,796 3,824 6,972
Female observations 1,018 450 1,018 1,018 366 652
Firms 6,334 3,778 6,334 6,334 2,834 4,630
Avg. obs. per firm 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
sample split 
Notes: This table presents the results of random effects panel probit regressions for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard 
errors. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference category are 
manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of firms in (1C) and (1D) does not add up to the number of firms in the full sample (N=10,796), as the 
firms may have differing expectations over the years and therefore may be present in both samples after the split.
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Table 8: Random effects panel tobit regressions of investment financing
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
investment financing, share of ~
internal 
capital
external
capital
business
development
capital
other 
funds
Female owner (d) 5.405 -7.795** -0.849 1.911
(3.340) (3.524) (3.978) (5.968)
Lagged FTE (log) -10.41*** 6.969*** 5.424*** 17.31***
(1.564) (1.647) (1.888) (2.898)
Lagged sales (log) -0.637 3.940*** 1.316 -8.143***
(1.399) (1.477) (1.703) (2.557)
Investment rate (inv./sales) -20.72*** 12.21*** 18.24*** 9.453***
(1.416) (1.396) (1.351) (2.076)
Cash flow 1.34e-05*** -1.07e-05*** 8.13e-07 -8.79e-06***
(1.69e-06) (1.78e-06) (1.91e-06) (3.12e-06)
Sales growth 3.850 -4.058 6.991** 1.377
(2.702) (2.906) (3.535) (5.277)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -3.947 11.33*** -12.57*** -2.524
(2.927) (3.142) (3.728) (5.564)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -4.818* 11.05*** -6.717* -8.950*
(2.863) (3.048) (3.468) (5.257)
Firm age >20 years (d) -6.548** 14.23*** -7.772** -11.63**
(2.942) (3.112) (3.522) (5.356)
Graduate (d) 14.34*** -15.13*** -3.101 -1.183
(2.079) (2.175) (2.465) (3.700)
Age firm owner 0.310*** -0.339*** -0.264** -0.323*
(0.109) (0.115) (0.131) (0.195)
Constant 107.0*** -76.92*** -85.45*** -54.17*
(16.63) (17.59) (20.24) (30.14)
Observations 13,294 13,294 13,294 13,294
Female observations 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,269
left-censored 2,425 7,023 10,981 11,576
uncensored 5,567 4,820 2,170 1,453
right-censored 5,302 1,451 143 265
Number of firms 7,847 7,847 7,847 7,847
Avg. Obs. per firm 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression of investment financing for the years 
2004-2009. Only firms with one owner/manager included. Each regression includes industry, legal form and time 
dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship 
that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Random effects panel GLS regressions of credit application and outcome
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent 
Variable (1/0)
(1)
applied for 
credit
(2)
application 
denied
(1A)
applied for 
credit
with
expect.
(1B)
applied for 
credit
with exp.
 interact.
(1C)
applied for 
credit
 firms with 
pos. exp.
(1D)
applied for 
credit
 firms without 
pos. exp.
Female owner (d) -0.044* -0.017 -0.044* -0.053** -0.014 -0.056**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) (0.027)
Positive sales expectat. (d) 0.027** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.013)
Interact female*pos. exp. (d) 0.026
(0.042)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.030*** 0.016 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.064*** 0.013
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013)
Lagged sales (log) 0.053*** -0.023** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.031* 0.065***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
Planned investment rate 0.778*** 0.044 0.772*** 0.771*** 0.747*** 0.791***
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.065) (0.051)
Cash flow -4.87e-08*** -3.45e-08*** -4.85e-08*** -4.85e-08*** -4.40e-08** -5.94e-08***
(1.29e-08) (8.31e-09) (1.28e-08) (1.28e-08) (1.82e-08) (1.74e-08)
Return on sales (lag) -0.010** -0.185*** -0.010** -0.010** 0.021 -0.014***
(0.005) (0.054) (0.005) (0.005) (0.052) (0.004)
Sales growth 0.025 -0.073*** 0.025 0.025 -0.014 0.042
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.0007 -0.054** 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.005
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.035) (0.027)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.007 -0.027 0.011 0.011 -0.034 0.036
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.018 -0.061*** 0.023 0.023 0.007 0.033
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.026)
Graduate (d) -0.104*** 0.009 -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.110*** -0.103***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017)
Age firm owner -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -4.42e-05 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation activities (d) 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.031** 0.030** 0.007 0.041***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015)
Constant -0.175 0.413*** -0.178 -0.179 0.008 -0.270*
(0.121) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.197) (0.148)
R-squared 0.231 0.060 0.232 0.232 0.212 0.243
Observations 5,777 2,875 10,796 10,796 1,964 3,813
Female observations 518 210 1,018 1,018 174 344
Firms 3,635 2,046 6,334 6,334 1,527 2,652
Avg. obs. per firm 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
sample split 
Notes: This table presents the results of random effects panel GLS regressions for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard 
errors. Only firms with one owner-manager included. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification 
variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.*,** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of firms in (1C) and (1D) does not add up to the number of 
firms in the full sample (N=10,796), as the firms may have differing expectations over the years and therefore may be present in both samples 
after the split.
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